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Books,,,
From Refugees To
Citizens
At Home |
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It is now possible to put forward the
main elements of the refugees’ return plan.
1-
Locating the Refugees
The Palestinian people are a very closely-knit family. Geographical
dispersion in exile did not destroy the essential fabric of the
society. They still marry within their own social circles, as they
were in 1948-Palestine, although travel and residence in foreign
countries have eroded this practice only marginally. This however
has a positive effect as the foreign spouses have been drawn into
the Palestinian circle. In general, there does not seem to be a
serious problem in locating and identifying Palestinian families.
This family bond is important, especially for the Palestinian
refugees who were not registered by UNRWA in 1950 or any time
thereafter. The unregistered refugees are essentially the
inhabitants of Palestinian cities who either left early in 1948, did
not have a material need for assistance, which was the object of
registration, or others who, while needy, did not register out of
pride, prior to closing down of the registration process, or who
missed the registration for one reason or another.
Careful estimates show that all refugees from 531 depopulated towns
and villages by Israeli forces in 1948 are 4,940,000 as at the end
of 1998, fifty years after al Nakba of 1948. Of those, 3,602,000 are
registered with UNRWA.
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Total refugees may be divided as follows
(Fig. 14): 56% are registered refugees from villages; they
have the highest percentage of registration and they lost all
livelihood by losing their homes, farms and cattle. Therefore it is
not surprising that only 6% of villagers are unregistered. The total
is 62% or about two-thirds of all refugees representing rural areas.
The remaining 38% are urban population. More than half of those
(21%) are unregistered, leaving 17% registered. If we take the
registered refugees only, we find that 23% are urban and 77% are
rural, showing again that the majority of rural refugees are
registered.
It should be noted that refugees were expelled, not only from 531
towns and primary villages, but also from 662 secondary villages,
such as hamlets, satellites or small settlements.
There is no record of any Arab people in the Middle East as detailed
and monitored over 50 years as that of the Palestinian refugees. At
the time of registration, refugees had to show proof of residence in
Palestine, e.g. Kushan (property title deed), passport, identity
card, tax receipt, school certificate, government employment record…
etc.
There are now over 700,000 family files and about 4 million
individual files held by UNRWA. The following is listed: full name
(including father, grandfather and family), sex, date of birth,
place of origin (depopulated village), district, rank and
relationship within the family (48 categories), number of family
members and place of refuge. The latter is divided into 5 areas in
which UNRWA operates: Gaza Strip, West Bank, Jordan, Syria and
Lebanon. In turn, these areas are divided into regions and those
into distribution centres. Every refugee has a unique number. It is
possible to mobilize the people of any given village in a week.
Indeed, when the inhabitants of a village were expelled by the
Israelis in 1948, they left en masse. Fully 72% of all the
registered refugees moved to only one of the 5 UNRWA areas and 20%
moved to two related areas of the five and only 8% moved to more
than three areas.
Thus locating the refugees poses no problem.
2-
Locating the Refugees’ Land
The British Mandatory government in Palestine (1920-1948) documented
the country in a series of detailed maps. This has served to
preserve the Palestinian property rights, although the intention of
the pro-Zionist government was the opposite, to facilitate Jewish
immigration and settlement in Palestine by transferring to Jews as
much land as possible.
In spite of persistent efforts, the Zionists did not have under
their possession in 1948 more than 1,682,000 dunums or 6% of
Palestine. This figure, which is the upper limit of land under
Jewish possession, consists of :
Full
Possession 1,449,958
dunums
Undivided share in a Common Land 56,628
dunums
British
Concessions 175,000 dunums
Not all the land under ‘full possession’ above was legally
registered in the Land Registry. A considerable portion of this land
was held or cultivated by the Jews on the basis of interim
agreements, promises to sell, doubtful claims or in contravention
with the Mandate Land Regulations. The fortnightly reports of the
District Commissioners are replete with examples of fraud, unfounded
or illegal claims. In Beer Sheba District, for example, the areas
claimed by the Jews and included in the above summary are greatly
exaggerated as evidenced by the District Commissioner’s report.
Much land is cultivated in Palestine as common village land (Musha’)
which cannot be divided by shareholders, who are traditionally
family members. When the Jews bought the share of one family member,
they could not identify or split this share physically, much the
same like a share on the stock exchange. Thus the Jewish ownership
of undivided land remains an economic, not a physical, proposition.
The pro-Zionist Mandate government granted concessions to the Jewish
colonists which had a given purpose and a maturity date, after which
the land reverts back to the people of the land at the time. All
concessions expired in 1948, when the British Mandate was dissolved
on 15 May 1948.
Thus the figure for Jewish property in Palestine, small as it is,
represents the upper limit of Jewish possession. Further, legal
Jewish purchases are well documented as the great majority of such
land was owned by colonial enterprises, not individuals, who kept
records of transactions and ownership.
Be that as it may, it is clear that the remainder of Palestine is
(non-Jewish) Palestinian property for countless generations.
Palestinians should not be required to prove evidence, much as any
region in England does not require proof of being British. The onus
of proof of ownership lies with the foreign immigrants who wanted to
secure a foothold in the country.
The UN, in its well-known resolution 194, formed the Conciliation
Commission of Palestine (CCP). One of the lasting benefits of CCP is
the documentation of Palestinian property in Palestine from the
Mandate records and in consultation with Israel, Jordan and other
Arab countries.
CCP recorded the ownership of about 500,000 Palestinian landowners,
whose ownership covers an area of 5,194,091 dunums, classified under
each of the administrative boundaries of towns and villages. The
survey covered 797,504 parcels of land, which are well-defined on
maps. Although these records are extremely valuable, they do not
cover the whole extent of Arab Palestine. This deficiency is clearly
seen by comparing the official area of each district with the total
ownership (Jewish and Palestinian) of all lands in the district.
Considerable deficiency of ownership according to CCP records is
found in the sub-districts of Gaza, Hebron, Jaffa, Jenin, Jerusalem,
Ramle and Tulkarm. CCP admits lack of information in Ramle sub
district and in Jerusalem villages. More significantly, CCP omitted
the entire Beer Sheba sub-district (12,577,000 d.) due to ‘lack of
information’.
With the detailed British maps and the Land Registry records, and by
subtracting authentic Jewish ownership records from the area of
Palestine, the property of the Palestinian refugees is determined.
Individual owners in each village/town are determined from CCP
records. Village land is determined from administrative maps of
Palestine which define the village boundary and area (according to
Village Statistics of 1945). The village inhabitants are determined
from UNRWA records. Thus the village land area, location and
boundary, together with the names, number and present place of
refuge of its owners (usually limited to 3-4 hamulas or extended
families) are all satisfactorily determined.
3-
Transfer of Ownership
The fictitious legal web created by Israel (see section 4 above) has
the unexpected advantage of making it easier for the Palestinians to
restore the ownership of their property. All their land is
administered by Israel Land Administration (ILA) which disposes of
their property. No Jew holds a legal title deed to a Palestinian
property. There will be no possibility of a multitude of legal
disputes among Palestinian and Jewish individuals.
A simple way to deal with this situation is to transfer all legal
jurisdiction from ILA to the proposed Palestine Land Commission
(PLC). PLC will be created as an independent body to represent,
defend and preserve material property rights of the Palestinians.
Its members are representatives of 531 depopulated and dispossessed
Palestinian towns and villages. As indicated earlier, the family
unit in Palestine is very strong. Hence the village unit (and
neighbourhoods in towns) can be regarded as stable building blocs of
Palestinian society.
PLC will be the custodian for all property until individual owners
are identified and verified. PLC will hold and acquire the property
of those few who wish to dispose of it.
This system has many advantages. There will be a single transfer
document form ILA to PLC. The records of ILA in its central and
district offices contain electronic information of all Palestinian
property in addition to maps showing parcels’ locations (with their
British and new Israeli numbers) which are largely digitized with
proper geographical coordinates under GIS.
The ownership of each village is well-defined in area and location
in British maps. While the population of each village has increased
more than 5 times in the last 50 years, the ownership of each family
remains intact. Any dispute over ownership will remain essentially a
family business.
Thus a smooth transfer is possible. Problems or disputes which may
inevitably arise are transferred to PLC and, in turn, to village
families.
4- Phases
of Return
Due to the nature of repatriated groups, it is possible to split
repatriation into 7 phases, each with a population varying between
0.5 and 1.0 million. See
Table 1. Some phases could be concurrent. The
whole process could take less than 10 years. These phases are:
4.1-
Return of Refugees from Syria and Lebanon.
(Fig15)
Their rounded-off number is 500,000, which represents the registered
villagers from the districts of Haifa, Acre, Tiberias, Safad and
Nazareth – excluding cities. All these refugees can return safely to
their vacant village sites. There are only few affected villages
(Table 1), where their village sites have been partially or fully
built-over, as they are situated in the Area A, which has the
highest Jewish concentration. There are only two such villages,
which are both in Area A and fully built-over. These are: Tira,
Wa’arat es Saris in Haifa district.
In general, these refugees will return to a friendly environment.
They will be reunited with their long-separated kith and kin in
Galilee, which is still largely Palestinian today.
4.2-
Return of Refugees from Gaza Strip.
(Fig. 16)
Gaza Strip is the most crowded (about 6,000 persons/sq. km) and
economically impoverished place; that is where the refugees from
southern Palestine are crammed. Across the barbed wire, they can see
their fields empty (at only 6 persons/sq. km). The rounded-off
number of the registered refugees from villages in Beer Sheba, Gaza,
Ramle and Jaffa districts is 686,000. The return to Beer Sheba and
Gaza districts is straightforward, as their land is almost empty. As
Table 1 shows, Qiryat Gat has expanded to cover the location of Iraq
Al Manshiya houses, but the village land is still available. (The US
Computer Company, Intel, has illegally built a plant on the location
of the village houses).
Ramle refugees can return to their villages in the district, which
is situated in Areas A, B, and C. Higher Jewish density in Area A
causes 2 villages to be affected: Aqir and Wadi Hunayn, and in Area
B 3 villages are affected:Sarafand al Kharab, Al Burj, Jindas. Jaffa
villages need a special treatment.
4.3- Return of Registered Village Refugees from the West Bank.
(Fig. 17)
The rounded-off number of registered village refugees now living in
the West Bank is 378,000. Their original homes are diverse (9
districts). They come from nearby Jenin, Jerusalem, Tulkarm and
Hebron districts, from Gaza and Beer Sheba districts in the south,
from Jaffa and Ramle districts in the centre, and from Haifa in the
north. The number of refugees from each district is relatively
small, ranging from a maximum of 71,000 from Jerusalem district down
to 14,000 and 16,000 from Beer Sheba and Gaza districts
respectively.
As indicated above, there is no problem in returning to vacant
village sites in Gaza, Beer Sheba districts. Also, there is no
problem in returning to Jerusalem district except for 5 villages:
Lifta, Deir Yassin, Maliha, Ein Karem and al Jura, which are
incorporated in greater Jerusalem. The subject of Jerusalem city
deserves a special treatment which is excluded from this study.
Return to Haifa district is already covered in section (12.4.1).
Return to Jenin district poses no problem but Tulkarm district does.
Eight villages fall within the coastal strip, which is densely
populated by Jews and many of their sites are over-built. These are:
Um Khalid (Netanya extended over its land), Khirbet Beit Lid, Wadi
Qabbani, Biyarat Hanun, Ghabet Kafr Sur, Tabsur, Kafr Saba (next to
Kefar Sava) and Khirbet al Manshiya. These are small villages. Their
total present (1998) population is 19,000. Treatment of all such
affected villages shall follow.
4.4- Return of Registered Village Refugees from Jordan
(Fig. 17)
This group is by far the largest, at 1,134,000. Their composition is
similar to refugees in the West Bank with the addition of 3 new
districts: Tiberias, Beisan (close to river Jordan) and Nazareth.
The reason for their large number and the relatively small number of
refugees in the West Bank is due to the 1967 war. Today the number
of displaced persons as a result of the 1967 war is estimated to be
800,000 persons, who were expelled or forced to leave Palestine to
Jordan. (The figure of 800,000 includes refugees and citizens of the
West Bank ).
The feasibility of their return is similar to those of the West Bank
(12.4.3). The village sites in the new districts: Tiberias, Beisan
and Nazareth are all vacant. However, a hamlet, al Manara, is built
over by the expansion of Tiberias city. Nazareth district and part
of Tiberias and Beisan districts are today inhabited by a sizeable
Palestinian population.
4.5- Cities:
The previous phases refer to the registered refugees from villages
only. The great majority of village sites are still vacant. Many of
the village houses were destroyed by the Israelis. According to a
field survey in 1987-1990, out of 407 villages surveyed, 81 villages
were completely obliterated, 140 destroyed but rubble identified, 60
demolished with standing walls, 74 most houses demolished but some
remain standing, 17 villages with many houses demolished and where
1-2 Jewish families live and 35 villages with houses standing where
more than 2 Jewish families live.
The situation in the cities is different. No large scale demolition
took place, but the remaining Palestinian inhabitants were not
allowed to repair their houses, even to fix a glass pane, or to add
an extra family room. Houses of evicted Palestinians were occupied
by Jewish immigrants who were allowed to make all desired
alterations.
In all, the Israelis conquered 14 Palestinian cities
(Table 2). These may be grouped as follows: 2 cities:
Nazareth and Shafa Amr are still Palestinian. The return of the
refugees there will not represent a problem. Six cities were
entirely Palestinian: Safad, Tiberias, Beisan, Beer Sheba, Al Majdal
(Ashqelon) and Isdud, except that Safad and Tiberias had a small
old-time Jewish religious community. Those six cities (termed
thereafter Group 2, G2) are now inhabited entirely by Jews, a clear
case of ethnic cleansing. In the following phases we shall examine
the possibilities of return to these cities.
The remaining 6 cities, (termed thereafter Group 1, G1) have special
characteristics. Many of them are coastal; all have had always mixed
Jewish and Palestinian population with the difference that, before
1948, Palestinians were a majority, now Jews are the majority. These
are: Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle and Jerusalem. Of all the 14
cities, there should be no insurmountable problem in the return of
refugees to their homes, except for two: Jaffa, which lies in the
middle of Jewish concentration in Palestine and Jerusalem, not so
located but has a highly sensitive political and religious
significance.
4.6-
The Return of Registered and Unregistered City Refugees (Group 2).
The number of registered city refugees in Safad, Tiberias, Beisan,
Beer Sheba, Majdal and Isdud is about 182,000. Here, those
unregistered are much smaller than the case for larger cities. Their
number is 78,000. For the sake of completeness, we add to this phase
the unregistered village refugees, who did not, or were unable to
register for reasons cited. Their number is 280,000; they pose no
problem as they all come from empty or vacant sites. Thus the total
number of refugees for this phase is 540,000.
It is now necessary to examine the town plan of each city. This is
done using (1) British Mandate town planning maps showing the
built-up areas, town planning urban limit and the town’s rural land
and (2) the built-up area of the city according to modern Israeli
maps (year 1998) showing the extent of the present urban area. In
order to compare 1948 and 1998 areas, Palestinian town’s area of
1948 is expanded, in the space available now, to reflect the present
Palestinian population had they not been evicted. This is shown (in
purple) in all diagrams of cities, together with 1948 (Palestinian)
and 1998 (Israeli) urban limits.
The results are shown in
Figs. (18,
19,
20,
21,
22,
23). In all cases, it is shown that Palestinians can return
to their cities and can build new homes, for the increased
population, in the city land without necessarily evicting the
present Jewish occupants as done by Israel to the Palestinians in
1948.
In Safad, the city can expand to the north and east to accommodate
the returnees. In Tiberias, the expansion can take place along the
shoreline of the lake. In Beisan, there is plenty of space for
expansion in all directions except the south. Beer Sheba has
expanded greatly, mostly to the north, leaving east and west and
possibly the south for new expansion to accommodate the returning
home owners.
Isdud does not present a problem at all. The city can expand around
its original position, which was a large village. The new Israeli
Isdud (Ashdod) is built elsewhere, on the shoreline where a large
port is built.
Al Majdal can expand in all directions except the south. Again the
new Majdal (Ashqelon) is built on the shoreline.
It is significant to note that all of the six cities are now
inhabited by non-Ashkenazi Jews. As such, they do not benefit from
the favours showered on the Ashkenazi ruling elite. They suffer from
discrimination and are economically impoverished, but less so for
Isdud due to the port activity and Beer Sheba where the university
provides large employment.
With the dismantling of Israel’s racist policies, and the removal of
Zionist incitement to Arab hatred, it is possible for the
Palestinian returnees to live in harmony with the present Jewish
inhabitants who are mostly Mizrahi, that is Jews from Arab and
Islamic countries.
4.7- The Return of the Registered City Refugees (Group 1)
This phase refers to the return of 653,000 refugees back to the
cities of Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle and West Jerusalem (Group
1). Their return is often mentioned as a symbol for the return of
all refugees. The Palestinian demonstrations, petitions and
political statements often refer to the return to “Jaffa and Haifa”.
The Israelis respond with ready-made answers and programmed fear:
“This will dismantle Israel”. This symbolism refers however to a
particular case and a small number of refugees. Even so, closer
examination gives a more realistic picture.
First, it must be recognized that Palestinians do now live in the
cities of Group 1. More than 80,500 Palestinians live in 5 cities of
Group 1 excluding (West) Jerusalem, out of a total of 173,400
Palestinians in all of the 14 Palestinian cities. (This study is
concerned with all territories occupied by Israel in 1948 and
bounded by the inner line of the Armistice Agreement of 1949. It
thus includes West Jerusalem in which no Palestinians live today).
Acre and Haifa (Fig.
24,
25) are known to enjoy relatively peaceful coexistence
between Palestinians and Jews. The Palestinians still live in the
Old City of Acre and the returnees can expand this city along the
shoreline, still within Acre lands. Haifa’s Palestinian population
are an active element in the society. They still live in large
concentrations in old Haifa particularly Wadi Nisnass, Abbas, Carmel
and old city. But metropolitan Haifa has still large vacant spaces
to the south and east, sufficient to accommodate the new comers.
Lydda and Ramle, which were once a proud, rich and vibrant twin,
have now been reduced to a lamentable state of decay. The decay is
both urban, out of neglect and biased administration, and moral;
they are the centre of drug trade. Palestinians there suffer from
economic deprivation and social incohesion. New Jewish immigrants
are sent there; they desert the place as soon as they know the
country better. It is to them a ma’abarot, a transit centre.
With the return of the original homeowners, they can bring back
lustre and dynamism to these cities, especially with the return of
well-known merchant families, writers and artists back to their
cities.
As
Fig. 26 shows, the amalgamation of the twin cities is
inevitable. The expansion of the two cities to accommodate the
returnees is quite possible. In addition to their famed agriculture,
their location, astride railway and road junctions, will bring
affluence to the now decaying cities by virtue of the energies of
its returning merchants.
The return to Jaffa (Fig.
27) is a difficult but not unsolvable problem. The reason is
that Jaffa is surrounded by heavy Jewish concentration of all sides,
leaving it open only to the sea. The southern settlements of Bat Yam
and Holon have encroached upon Jaffa (rural) land, reducing its
capacity for expansion. With significant numbers of Palestinians
still in Ajami, new neighbourhoods have been built in eastern Jaffa
lands, which were largely planted with orange groves, stretching
from Saknet Abu Kabir through Saknet Darwish to ‘Arab Village’ in
the south. These are now called Jaffa central, Jaffa alef, dalet,
gimel. The population there is thoroughly mixed. With high rise
construction, as in neighbouring Tel Aviv, it is possible to
accommodate 100,000 families in about 3 sq. km. This requires both
good planning and good neighbourly relations.
Jerusalem is, and will always be, a special case. Almost all
Jerusalem land (urban and rural) have been built-over. Jerusalem
should be the subject of a detailed separate study.
4.8-
The Return of Unregistered City Refugees (Group 1)
This last phase of repatriation involves 900,000 unregistered
refugees from the six major Palestinian cities. Today they hold
important financial and governmental positions in Amman, Beirut, the
Gulf, London and Washington. They are the most mobile, affluent and
sophisticated segment of the society, but unlike 1948, their
political influence in Palestinian affairs today is minimal.
Their return, in terms of housing, would pose the same problems as
that of the registered refugees, although they possess much more
property. The size of their holdings, together with their business
experience and contacts will add vitality to the economic life of
the cities.
5- The
Restitution of Village and City Property
It has been shown that most of the village sites are vacant and the
refugees could return to their homes without difficulty. As
Table (3) shows, only 57 villages, out of 531 towns
and villages are affected in a way or another, by the encroachment
of Jewish urban expansion. The present exiled population of these
villages is 414,000, or about 10% of all registered refugees. This
means that fully 90% of the refuges can return home without
difficulty.
The picture is even brighter than this. It is considered that the
problem area is related to villages (1) which falls in Area A, with
high Jewish density and (2) where its site is fully built-over. This
applies only to 24 villages, 5% of all villages. Their present
population is 160,000, or 4% of registered refugees (3% of all
refugees), which is a tiny minority.
The largest number of highly affected villages lies naturally in the
coastal strip where there is highest Jewish concentration in and
around Tel Aviv. This includes villages such as Salama, Sarona,
Summeil (Mas’udiya), Jarisha, Jammasin Gharbi and Sharqi, Yazur,
Beit Dajan and Sheikh Muannis on which Tel Aviv university is built.
Affected villages near West Jerusalem are Lifta, Deir Yassin, al
Jura and Maliha (on whose land the notorious Gilo settlement is
built).
All Jewish-occupied Palestinian property in all cities can be dealt
with smoothly.
For all these cases: the affected villages and cities, the ownership
is transferred first from ILA to PLC, then it is handed over by PLC
to eligible and qualified property-owners. Those owners then extend
the existing lease of the Jewish occupant, if he wishes so, to a
period depending on the owner’s family requirements but not less
than 3 years. The owner may elect meanwhile to build a house in
another location, until his property becomes free. Funds for this
construction come from the compensation due, including the revenue
of the property for the last 53 years in accordance with UN
resolutions.
For all other villages (over 90%), the procedure is straightforward.
Villagers take possession of their land directly, unless some elect
to continue the lease of some of their land for agricultural uses.
The problems of this transaction are minimal, given the reasons
cited above about the Kibbutz agriculture.
6-
Sequence of Homes Construction
The previously outlined 7 phases are meant to describe the
categories of returnees according to whether they are registered or
unregistered, whether city or village refugees, and according to
their place of refuge at present.
These phases do not imply time sequence. To create a time schedule,
it is possible to identify the following ‘standard’ unit for housing
construction to replace demolished villages:
Number of returnees 330,000
Housing units required 66,000
Built-up area, m2 10.0 million
Number of months allowed 12.0
Labour required 82,500
Average village population 5,000
Average number of villages 66
Using the above unit as a yardstick, construction for registered
village refugees from Syria and Lebanon, (Phase 1), will take 1½
years, followed by registered village refugees from the West Bank,
(Phase 3), which will take 1 year, followed by: registered and
unregistered city refugees (G2) + unregistered village refugees,
(Phase 5), which will take 1½ years, followed by: registered city
refugees (G1), Phase 6, which will take 2 years. This makes a total
of 6 years.
Simultaneously another construction activity could start with:
registered village refugees from Gaza, (Phase 2), which will take 2
years, followed by registered village refugees from Jordan, (Phase
4), which will take 3½ years.
The remainder, i.e. the repatriation of unregistered city refugees
of G1, could start following the conclusion of the two construction
activities. The total period required is eight years. Allowing for
various unforeseen obstacles, the whole process may take 10 years,
in order to rebuild all houses or refurbish them.
This is of course is a rough estimate. It could be shorter because
only villagers need new construction. It could also be longer to
allow for natural increase during the ten years of repatriation
(about 1.5 million).
The above two construction activities would require 165,000
construction workers for up to 10 years. Is this labour force
available?
At present, the labour force in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
(OPT = West Bank and Gaza) is about 20% of the population, including
unemployed labour. This is well below the potential labour
percentage of 38.7%. Taking the lower figure of 20% and taking into
consideration that 25% of the labour is employed in construction,
the available Palestinian construction labour force within all
refugee population is about 250,000. Construction labour force in
OPT (refugees and non-refugees) in 1998 was 142,000, of which about
70,000 work legally in Israel. It thus appears there is no shortage
of labour for the repatriation process.
The Total cost of construction and infrastructure for full
repatriation is in the order of $45 billion over a period of 10
years. This can be financed from the total compensation package to
be paid by Israel to the refugees for 53 years of suffering,
exploitation and destruction of property and for war crimes in
accordance with resolution 194 and international law. Financial aid
may be obtained from USA and Europe.
In the final analysis, it is possible to construct a financial
package in which aid in kind, self-employment, advance payments for
future projects can be incorporated. The result would be that the
required cash outlay would be much less than the above figure.
As soon as repatriation becomes possible, advance parties from each
village can take possession of their land and set up temporary
centres and accommodation. As rehabilitation process proceeds, more
refugees of the village can return home.
Already there are several examples in the Middle East for massive
housing projects. In addition to Israel’s tenfold increase (through
both natural increase and immigration) of its 1948 Jewish population
of 600,000, we can cite the examples of Amman’s expansion (ten
times), Beirut’s (six times), and Kuwait’s (thirty-three times), in
which the Palestinian refugees themselves played a key role.
7-
International Action
This plan for the refugees’ return may be considered logical and
necessary, but it remains theoretical, unless the force of
international law is brought to bear on the responsible party. The
victims must be rescued from the injustice visited upon them by a
far more superior military power. International law was implemented
by big powers in Kuwait, East Timor, Kosovo and Bosnia. This could
be done again in Palestine.
It is true that political expediency and strategic interests of the
US, rather than concern for human rights, have been the major
motivation for its international action. In this century, it is
impossible to separate human rights from peace and stability, hence
strategic interests of big powers. The world is becoming literally a
global village. The overwhelming world-wide support for the
Palestinians, excluding the US and some countries in Europe, cannot
be ignored for long.
Europe, particularly, must take a leading role in initiating
positive action. Not only because the Palestinians are made to foot
the bill for the problem created in and by Europe, but because of
the close geographical and economic connections between both sides
of the Mediterranean.
There are already many examples of positive international action in
Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor. Not only was force used when
necessary, measures were also taken to remove or reduce the
obstacles preventing return. In the former Yogoslavia, the Committee
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination has recommended
changes in domestic laws and regulations concerning naturalization,
acquisition of citizenship, determination of refugee status and
tenure to bring them in line with international law. When local
authorities refused to reform or repeal discriminatory laws, the
international community has, in Kosovo, unilaterally repealed laws
that negatively impact the rights of the refugees.
Assuming that certain western powers cease to be an obstacle and
join the rest of the world in enforcing international law, the
following action may be taken:
The Security Council should act to implement Resolution 194, first
passed in December 1948 and reaffirmed annually ever since, by all
possible means at its disposal. The resolution should be implemented
at “the earliest practicable date”, which has been suspended, due to
Israel’s intransigence, from the original date of July 1949, the
date of the last Armistice Agreement, till today.
The resolution entitles the refugees to return to their original
homes, not to any other location, and in addition, to compensation
for material and psychological damages and losses, including loss of
revenue, in accordance with international law and legal precedents.
War Crimes, which have been referred in Resolution 194 to a special
court, shall be dealt with by the International Criminal Court,
created by the Statute of Rome in July 1998.
After the implementation of the Right of Return, compensation
procedure may be established as a separate but subsequent step.
Compensation can never be a substitute for return. Homeland is not
for sale.
Resolution 194 has already created the mechanism for implementing
the return in the form of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine
(CCP). Care should be exercised to avoid aborting its activities, as
Ben Gurion did in 1949-1951. The mandate for CCP should be bolstered
to deal with the present situation. CCP should be able to implement
the Right of Return under the pain of sanctions (similar to the Iraq
case), should set up a compensation agency (there are many
applicable precedents), should take up the role of protecting the
returnees physically and legally during the whole process of
rehabilitation. This protection has not been spelled out clearly, as
it should. The protection afforded by the UNHCR should be added to
the CCP mandate. UNHCR has excluded the Palestinian refugees from
its protection by virtue of clause 1D, due to the unique status of
the Palestinian people. In a serious legal study, UNHCR mandate is
shown to add protection to the refugees, not to diminish it.
The civil, religious and political rights of the returnees have
already been clearly delineated in chapters (2) and (3) of
Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1947. This should be
incorporated in the CCP mandate to safeguard the returnees’ rights
and prevent them from being victims of any kind of discrimination
and apartheid practices.
With the return of the refugees, they must recover their
nationality. According to international law , the people and
territory go together. Whoever takes over the territory must also
take the people.
UNRWA has a lot of work to do. With its 21,000 staff and its
tremendous experience of providing uninterrupted service to the
refugees, through 4 wars and innumerable raids and attacks, for the
last 50 years, it has a unique standing. UNRWA should be expected to
take care of all operations of rehabilitation. It should turn itself
into a sort of UNDP, not only to build the infrastructure but also
to create economy-building projects. Its mandate will last for 10
years from the first date of return, then tails off for another 10
years.
Considering the success of the international operations of rescue
and rehabilitation after the Second World War and considering the
enormity of the Palestinian refugees’ plight, it is imperative that
the international community takes a firm stand. This is made
possible because the Palestinian case has by far the most
comprehensive legal groundwork and uniform international consensus.
It has been the major occupation of the UN since its inception half
a century ago. The UN can now act, with the long-denied support of
western powers, to implement international law and bring permanent
peace to the Middle East. This is befitting the largest, longest and
most politically important refugee problem in the world.
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