Response to F.
Hof Essay, “The Line of June 4, 1967”, MEI, Sept 1999.
by Dr Salman Abu Sitta
Dear Sir, Frederic Hof has written a timely and well-researched
essay on the dividing line between Syria and Israel since 1948.
This is particularly useful. The frequent reference in the news
to the June 4, 1967 line is not matched by a clear picture of
how and why this line came about and where it might be.
In my piece in a London newspaper (al Hayat, August 20, 1999,
p.14), I have described the history and significance of 3 lines:
the 1923 international boundary line, the July 20, 1949
Armistice line enclosing the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and the
mysterious June 4, 1967 line. Hof has covered much of the
factual background. So I will not repeat it here unless there is
a comment to make.
(1) The 1923 international boundary. It must be recalled that
this line, dividing a homogeneous Arab country, was created
largely to meet the Zionist plan submitted to the Paris Peace
conference in 1919.
The plan, presented to fulfil the promise made by Balfour to
hand over Palestine to the Jews, requires that all water
resources leading to Palestine shall be within it. On Feb 3,
1922, the British Officer Newcome and the French Officer Paulet
signed an agreement demarcating the boundary, which was ratified
by the High Commissioners of Palestine and Syria the following
year.
The efforts of Meinertzhagen, a British Colonial Officer, who
was an ardent Zionist and anti-Arab racist (according to his
‘Middle East Diary’) have led to the inclusion of the mouth of
River Yarmouk, River Jordan north of Tiberias, Huleh and
Tiberias lakes within the territory of Palestine but failed to
include Litani river which, the French insisted, would remain in
the new Christian state of Lebanon.
This brought havoc to the local population. Twenty two villages
of Safad District were dissected, leaving people cut off from
their land and livelihood. The unrest which followed led to The
Good Neighborly Agreement of 1926 which stipulated the following
terms:
1. Syria is a riparian country to Jordan. It has free access to
water anywhere for fishing, navigation and irrigation.
2. The inhabitants of the region, whether now classified as
Syrians or Palestinians, can move freely with their goods across
the boundary; they are subject to min. customs duty, not greater
than the lowest of either country.
3. A special committee shall be formed to resolve disputes.
Failing amicable resolution, the matter shall be referred to the
International Court of Justice, which was under the League of
Nations in Geneva.
4. In the 1923 agreement, Syria is entitled to the use of the
railway line to Samakh (a town at the southern edge of Lake
Tiberias), and a special pier for its goods there. This and
other positive provisions of the 1923 agreement were maintained.
Here we have a clearly special status for this area, a
forerunner of the DMZ. The reference to the International Court
of Justice is highly significant. If Syria does not recognize
the 1923 line (as the author states), this is probably in
relation to its rights in the territory of the DMZ.
I doubt if Syria will give up its rights under the 1926
Agreement. It remains the burden of Israel to prove that it has
any rights. The legal basis of these rights, whether as
inheritors of Colonial rule, according to UN resolution 181 for
the partition of Palestine or by military conquest should be
examined and agreed by the parties.
(2) The Armistice Line of 20 July 1949.
Syria entered Palestine on 15 May 1948 to save its people. On
that date, Jewish forces had already expelled 52% of the
refugees. The territory which Syria controlled on the date of
Armistice Agreement is the following: the north sector, north of
Azizat (4 sq. km.); the central sector, south of Huleh and a
strip along the Jordan (34 sq. km.) and the south sector, east
of Lake Tiberias (32 sq. km.).
This territory is largely Palestinian Arab. It had 10
Palestinian villages (Khan el Duweir in the northern sector;
Baqqara, Ghannameh, Mansurat el Khayt, Yirda in the central
sector; Samra, old and new Nuqeib, Kh. Tawafiq and al Hemma in
the southern sector). There were only two Jewish settlements:
Mishmar Hayarden and Ein Gev.
The author mentions the two Jewish settlements and only two of
the ten Palestinian villages. Another important fact, is that
this area was never controlled militarily by Israeli forces
prior to the Armistice Agreement.
It was Arab (Palestinian/Syrian), by historical continuity, not
“by default”. The map shown here reflects DMZ as interpreted
from the Armistice Agreement. Article V, para 5a, of the
Armistice Agreement states: “This provision applies to the Ein
Gev and Dardara sectors which shall form part of the
Demilitarized Zone”.
DMZ is not limited to the area bounded by the Armistice Line and
the boundary line. The quoted passage indicates this. (The
author’s map correctly defines the Armistice Demarcation Line as
per Annex 1 of the Armistice Agreement).
The negotiations leading to the Armistice Agreement were
strenuous lasting from April to July 1949. The Israelis insisted
on the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the area so that the
area becomes demilitarized.
The Syrians rejected this demand. Dr. R. Bunche the UN Acting
Mediator finally arrived at a solution by issuing what is known
as the “authoritative statement”. The author did not mention
this statement without which the Syrians would have never signed
the Armistice Agreement.
Three weeks before the signing, on 26 June 1949, Dr. Bunche sent
a letter to both the Israeli and Syrian sides. This letter is
part of the official record. In it he specifically excluded
Israel’s claims of sovereignty over the area to be included in
the Armistice Agreement. “Questions of permanent boundaries,
territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like
must be dealt with in the ultimate peace agreement and not in
the armistice agreement”, he stated (his emphasis).
It is to be pointed out that the listed topics reflect the same
issues stipulated by the 1926 Agreement. Dr. Bunche went on to
say, addressing Moshe Sharett, Israel’s Foreign Minister, “From
the beginning of these negotiations, our greatest difficulty has
been to meet Israel’s unqualified demand that Syrian forces be
withdrawn from Palestine.
We have now, with very great effort, persuaded the Syrians to
agree to this. I trust this will not be undone by legalistic
demands about broad principles of sovereignty and administration
which in any case would be worked out satisfactorily in the
practical operation of the scheme” (my emphasis). Dr. Bunche
extended the exclusion of Israel’s claims of sovereignty to
other demilitarized areas, such as the Government House and Mt.
Scopus in Jerusalem and El-Auja DMZ (260 sq. km.) on
Palestine/Egypt border. Two years after Dr. Bunche’s statement,
the Security Council, in its resolution on May 18, 1951 about
Israeli violations of the Armistice Agreement, affirmed his
statement and called upon the parties to give effect to “the
authoritative comment on article V of the Syrian – Israeli
Agreement”.
The Armistice conditions were clear. No political or military
activity in the area, the local population (Arab majority and
Jews) have freedom of living, work and movement, civil
administration and ‘Arab’ and Jewish local police are to be set
up, no heavy arms within 5 km of the armistice line and full
authority of UN Truce Supervision to supervise the civil
administration.
(3) The mysterious line of June 4, 1967.
Soon after the Armistice signing, Israelis started to assert
control of DMZ in an effort to claim sovereignty.
It is now well-documented that Israelis provoked clashes (80%
according to Dayan) with Syrians as a justification for
introducing military forces into the area. Obviously this was in
direct violation of the Armistice Agreement. Israelis then
started to divert the River Jordan and drain lake Huleh.
The Security Council condemned this action and ordered Israel to
stop all diversion work. US President, Gen. Eisenhower stopped
financial aid to Israel.
Israelis expelled most Palestinians from their villages to Syria
(3,770, now 23,100).
Those who remained (600) were relocated in Sha’ab near Acre. One
of them, Abu Salim Khawalid, had this to say in his testimony,
“The soldiers ordered us to leave the village that very night,
and threatened that if we did not leave, they would do to us
what was done to the inhabitants of Al-Husseiniya village.
We knew that the Jews had slaughtered dozens of them like sheep.
We were absolutely panic-stricken”. All these and similar
actions make the substance of “some 66,000 official complaints
about the conduct of the other”, which the author referred to in
passing.
A statement by the Israeli Foreign Minister on 15 April 1951
claimed Israeli sovereignty over DMZ as of 14 May 1948, on the
basis that, “it was always part and parcel of the British
Mandated Territory”.
The British immediately rejected the statement as “most menacing
assertion” and noted that Israel had on numerous occasions
firmly refused to have themselves regarded as the successors of
the former Palestine Government” and noted that “firm UN action
was necessary in order to combat Israeli pretensions”.
Ben Gurion was determined to seize the demilitarized zones in
the north with Syria, in Jerusalem with Jordan and in the south
(El Auja) with Egypt. Frequent attacks on Syria were designed to
provoke Nasser into war to defend Syria under the Combined
Defence Pact of 20 October 1955.
Nasser did not respond, neither did he respond when Egypt itself
was attacked in Subha and Kuntilla. So, another plan was
devised. The collusion of Britain, France and Israel in the Suez
Campaign of 1956 provided the required opportunity to seize both
DMZ areas in the north and the south.
By October 1956, Israeli troops under Sharon, have succeeded in
expelling the population of Auja, all the remaining Palestinians
in and around Huleh and in Samra and Nuqeib on Lake Tiberias.
This left a continuous strip of land in DMZ, approximately 40%
of the whole area, under Syrian control. It is clear therefore
that Israel only, not Syria as well, attempted “to take max
advantage” of the territory under the Armistice Agreement, and
there was no “ambiguity” about its terms.
Which line to follow?
First of all, June 4 line should be excluded. This line is not
officially shown on any map. It is not part of any agreement or
treaty.
It has no legal basis whatsoever. It is merely the line dictated
by the intrusion of Israeli forces into DMZ in strict violation
of the Armistice Agreement.
That is why it is omitted from my map. This line represents the
anti-thesis of peace.
Palestinian villages were destroyed, their inhabitants expelled,
their land confiscated, unauthorized diversion took place and
Israeli military occupation encroached on the area.
There can be no reward for these actions; they must not be
condoned, but should be undone.
The sovereignty issue:
The Armistice Agreement has clearly excluded the inclusion or
acceptance of Israel’s claims of sovereignty over DMZ under its
terms.
The claim that Israel is the Successor State to Palestine is
baseless. (In fact, this has been denied repeatedly by Israel
lest it should offer the Palestinians nationality and other
obligations of the state).
Israel claims that it should annex this area because it falls in
the Jewish part of the Partition Plan (UN Resolution 181). If
that is the contention, Israel should hand back 24% of Palestine
(6,320 sq. km. or about 100 times DMZ) occupied over and above
its allocation in the plan.
Syria shall insist on the return of the expelled refugees and
restitution of their land as “decided” by the Security Council
resolution of May 18, 1951. Syria will not accept Israeli
sovereignty on land beyond the agreed line whatever it may be.
It will be recalled that in the Peace Treaties with Egypt and
Jordan, Israel recognized the sovereignty of those countries on
lands beyond Palestine border while the reverse (sovereignty
inside Palestine border along the Armistice line) remained
qualified and left in abeyance pending eventual peace treaty
with the Palestinians.
No doubt, Syria would not concede sovereignty to Israel before
an acceptable agreement is made with the Palestinians.
The Military Issue :
Important visitors to Israel are taken routinely to the Golan to
see the cliffs towering over the ‘defenseless’ plains beyond
Tiberias.
This may impress those dignitaries but most military experts
agree these cliffs by themselves do not pose any appreciable
threat to Israel. In the age of rockets and sophisticated
aircraft, this terrain does not offer overwhelming advantages.
Even in a surprise attack, IDF can repulse any attack from its
fortified positions around Safad mountains. Moshe Arens, the
former Defence Minister, says that Syrian Army is “completely
inferior” to IDF.
Israelis propose buffer zones, early warning systems and other
communication equipment and expect the US to pay $ 10 billion
for that. (Similar amount was allocated for partial withdrawal
from the West Bank).
A similar early warning station built in Um-Khashaba in Sinai
(now moved to Urim in the Negev) failed to function as planned.
Massive armaments and huge funds paid by the US will not buy
peace. If anyone needs security, it is Syria.
Damascus lies within the range of Israeli artillery and it is
this artillery that should be pulled back. Syria respects its
agreements. It should be remembered that during the violent
clashes of 1951-1956, indeed from 1949 to 1967, not a single
Israeli civilian was killed, while dozens of Syrian civilians
were bombed and machine-gunned.
The water issue:
In the ultimate analysis, Israel is not concerned about a
military threat, or even a sovereignty issue.
Israel’s main objective is to control Arab water resources. All
else is secondary. It is believed that Syria will never
surrender its rights as a riparian state to the river Jordan and
lake Tiberias and may ask for compensation for its diverted
resources in the last 50 years. Such rights are clearly spelled
out in the 1926 Good Neighborly agreement.
The Armistice Agreement, although temporary in nature, did not
invalidate these rights.
The obstacles in negotiations are derived from Israel’s aim to
exploit the water resources exclusively. Israel now uses 50
million cubic meters (mcm) annually from Syrian Golan, 100 mcm
from Yarmouk river compared to 25, its share according to
Johnston Plan and 550 mcm, from Upper Jordan compared to its
share of 375. Two thirds of Israel’s water consumption is taken
illegally from Arab waters in and outside Palestine.
A report prepared by Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, which
remained classified for some time, shows the max. limit of
Israeli withdrawal from the Golan such that Arab water sources
remain under Israeli control. (see map).
On the face of it, Israel will look generous by returning “most”
of Golan to Syria. In fact, Syria would then be non-riparian and
its waters are diverted to Israel.
In conclusion, the author has presented a useful and carefully
worded resumé of the Israeli/Palestinian/Syrian border issue.
He is to be commended for his effort. Perhaps due to the close
association between US and Israel (which does not necessarily
reflect common national interests) and no doubt due to the
scarcity of Arab sources he found it easier to derive his
information from Israeli sources.
Nevertheless, the author tried hard to walk along the tight rope
of impartiality. It is hoped that the above comments will shed
some light on the issue from another perspective.
Permanent peace, when and if it comes, can only be based on
legitimate rights and international law. As we know well from
the tragic events of this century, naked power is transient and
leads to more bloodshed. None other than US President, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, has stated at the height of Suez Campaign in 1957,
“Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in
the face of UN disapproval be allowed to impose the conditions
of its withdrawal? If so, I fear we have turned back the clock
of international order”.
This sentiment should return to be the guiding principle for any
future dispute resolution.
Sincerely,
Salman Abu Sitta
October 28, 1999
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